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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
- - submits this brief in suppo1i of a timely filed notice of administrative

appeal. Mr. -

is a 52-year-old man who has been incarcerated for 30 years-over half of

his life- based on criminal acts for which he was convicted, but over which he has maintained
his innocence for three decades. He is serving an indetenninate te1m for two counts of attempted
mmder in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second an d third degreesa minimum sentence of thniy years and a maximum of life-for a crime he was convicted of
when he was just 23 years old. For thniy years, Mr. -

has maintained that he was

wrongfully a1Tested while standing at a com er of Amsterdam Avenue in Manhattan while a
shooting took place over a mile away between Amsterdam and Broadway. (Exhibit K, Pro Se
Parole Appeal at 4.)
ill Febrnary 2021, he became eligible for release on parole. Prior to appearing before the

panel, Mr . - filed a C.P.L. § 440.10 action challenging his underlying conviction. He
appeared before a panel of commissioners who summarily denied him release in a concluso1y
decision. ill addition, the Board committed reversible eITors. First, the Board e1Ted when it
issued its decision on the basis of an incomplete record. The Board failed to consider that the
record before them was incomplete as it lacked: (i) sentencing minutes from Justice Failla in Mr.
-

underlying conviction (Id. (box checked "No" next to "Sentencing Minutes")); (ii) an

incomplete institutional repo1i (e.g. Mr. -

New York bnth certificate was not included,

which would put into dispute his depo1iation order); and (iii) letters from the police, district
attorney, and sentencing comi (see Exhibit B, Parole Board Repo1i (box checked "No" next to
"Official Statements")); among other missing records. 1

The undersigned has filed a FOIL and a 9 NYCRR § 8000.5 request with Woodbowne CoITectional
Facility for the missing documents.
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Second, the Board e1Ted when it issued its decision in reliance upon a flawed COMPAS
assessment. To the extent the Board gave a reason for its decision, they relied upon a flawed
COMP AS assessment that misjudged Mr.

propensity for prison misconduct based on an

had a Tier 3 infraction, when he in fact did not. In their

enoneous notation that Mr. -

written decision the Board "heavily weighed" Mr. -

inconect "High" prison misconduct

score and used it as their primaiy reason for detennining that Mr. -

would be unable or

unwilling to follow the law if released. (Compare Exhibit C, COMPAS Repo1i in Pai·ole File,

with Exhibit J, Con ected COMP AS Repo1i.) Mr. -

filed a timely Notice of Appeal and

retained Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP to serve as his appellate counsel. The
undersigned filed a Notice of Appearance with the Appeals Unit on June 2, 2021. This appeal
followed.
The Boai·d's denial of

MI·.-

parole violated (a) New York State Executive Law,

(b) Conections Law, (c) administrative regulations, and (d) controlling state case law.
Accordingly, Mi·. -

seeks reversal of the Board's decision and immediate release or, in the

alternative, a de novo parole hearing conducted in compliance with controlling law.

Il.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The Boai·d of Parole's discretion in deciding parole release is limited by statute.

Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A) states that release shall be granted if "there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at libe1iy without violating the
law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfai·e of society and will not so deprecate
the seriousness of his crime as to undennine respect for the law." In reaching its release
decision, the Boai·d must consider all factors relevant to that standai·d, including (but not limited
to) the factors listed in Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A):
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(i) the institutional record including program goals and
accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational education,
training or work assignments, therapy and interactions with staff
and inmates;
(ii) perfo1mance, if any, as a paiiicipant in a temporaiy release
prograin;
(iii) release plans including community resources, employment,
education and training and suppo1i services available to the inmate;
(iv) any depo1i ation order issued by the federal government against
the inmate while in the custody of the depaiiment and any
recommendation regarding depo1iation made by the commissioner
of the depa1i ment pursuant to section one hundred fo1iy-seven of
the con ection law;
(v) any statement made to the board by the crime victim or the
victim's representative, where the crime victim is deceased or is
mentally or physically incapacitated;
(vi) the length of the detenninate sentence to which the inmate
would be subject had he or she received a sentence pursuant to
section 70.70 or section 70.71 of the penal law for a felony defined
in a1iicle two hundred twenty or aiiicle two hundred twenty-one of
the penal law;
(vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the
type of sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the
sentencing comi , the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate,
the pre-sentence probation repo1i as well as consideration of any
Initigating and aggravating factors, and activities following aiTest
prior to confinement; and
(viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and pattern of
offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement.
New York comis have identified several principles that liinit the Board's discretion.

First, the Boai·d cannot deny release based solely on the nature of the underlying offense. In Re
Rios v. NY. State Div. ofParole, 836 N .Y.S.2d 503, 2007 WL 846561, at *4-5 (Sup. Ct., Kings
Cty. 2007). Second, the Boai·d may give different weight to the statutory factors, but must
consider-and rationally weigh-all relevant factors and may not give weight to inelevant
3
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factors. See In R e King v. N. Y. State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423 , 432 (1st Dep 't 1993), ajf'd,
83 N .Y.2d 788 (N.Y. 1994);/n re Johnson v. N. Y. State Div. of Parole, 65 A.D.3d 838, 839 (4th
Dep 't 2009),· In Re Thwaites v. N. Y. State Bd. of Parole, 934 N .Y.S .2d 797, 799 (Sup. Ct.,
Orange Cty. 2011). Third, by statute, the Board must set fo1i h its reasons for denying parole in a
written decision "in detail and not in conclusory terms." N .Y. Exec. Law§ 259-i(2)(ii)(a); see
Mitchell v. New York State Div. of Parole, 58 A.D.3d 742, 743 (2d Dep 't 2009).

Further, if the Board does not grant parole, it must provide written documentation of its
reasons for reaching that decision. "Reasons for the denial of parole release shall be given in
detail, and shall, in factually individualized and non-concluso1y ten ns, address how the
applicable parole decision-making principles and factors listed in section 8002.2 of this Paii were
considered in the individual's case." 9 NYCRR § 8002.3. " In making a release detennination,
the Boai·d shall be guided by risk and needs principles, including the inmate's risk and needs
scores as generated by [COMPAS]. .. " 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a). "If a boai·d detennination,
denying release, depaiis from the department risk and needs assessment 's scores, the board shall
specify any scale within the depaiiment risk and needs assessment from which it depa1ied and
provide an individualized reason for such depaiiure." Id.

III.

ARGUMENT

A.

The Board's Decision Was Arbitrary and Capricious Because (i) It Failed To
Consider Mr. Age, (ii) It Improperly Considered His Refusal to Take a
Plea Deal in 1992, and (iii) It Gave Impermissible Weight to the Seriousness of
the Offense

The Boai·d 's decision was arbitraiy and capricious and, thus, unlawful in at least three
respects. First, the Boai·d did not consider that Mr. . . . . age makes him unlikely to commit
violent crimes in the future. Second, Collllllissioner Cmse improperly held Mr. . . . .
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decision not to take a plea deal dming his 1992 trial against him. Third, the Board gave
impermissible weight to the seriousness of Mr. . . . . offense, which took place 30 years ago.

L.

The Board Did Not Reasonably or Meaningfully Consider
~
Age

The Board must consider wheth er "there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not
incompatible with th e welfare of society .... " Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A). This
assessment must be fo1ward-looking, focusing ''primarily on who the person appearing before
the Parole Board is today an d on whether that person can succeed in the community after
release." Thwaites , 934 N .Y.S.2d at 699 (quoting Professor Phillip M. Genty, Columbia Law
School, "Changes to Parole Laws Signal Potentially Sweeping Policy Shift," NYLJ, September
1, 2011).
Mr. . . . . age is undeniably relevant to that inqui1y. There is significant evidence of a
strong con-elation between age and crime. See, e.g. , Dan a, Goldstein, The Marshall Project, Too
Old to Commit Crime? (March 20, 2015 at 1 :00 p .m .), available at
https://www.themarshallproject.org/201 5/03/20/too-old-to-commit-crime. As many studies have
shown, individuals are far less likely to commit violent crimes or diu g crimes after th eir 30s. See
id. Put simply, older people with health problems, see Exhibit I at 14-18 (documenting Mr.
-

health problems) are less physically capable ofrepresenting a threat to anyone. fudeed,

as th e Board con-ectly identified (even in the inco1Tect COMPAS repo1i before them, see infra
Section D), Mr. -

COMPAS repo1i demonstrated that for his "risk and ce1iain behaviors

upon being released to the community ... Everything is either low or unlikely." 2 (Exhibit A at

2

The full quote from Commissioner Cruse reads: " [COMPAS] measures your risk and certain behaviors
upon being released to the community. One is low risk, l O is high risk, your risk of felony violence is low, tv.•o,
an-est risk is low, absconding risk is low. Everything is either low or unlikely except your prison misconduct which

5
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10.) Mr. . . . . corrected COMPAS repo1i demonstrates that all of his risk and behavioral
factors are Low or Unlikely (Exhibit J at 5), which would qualify him for the lowest level of
parole supervision, which is an indication of minimal risk to society and minimal risk of
reoffending, Matter of Ciaprazi v Evans, 52 Misc. 3d 121 l (A), slip op. at *2,, 2016 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 2741 , at *3 (Sup. Ct., Duchess Cty. 2016).
Given the statuto1y factors they were mandated to consider, this issue should have been
top of mind for the Board, since they held a discussion about Mr. -

age, but only a curso1y

and concluso1y discussion of his growth. (See Exhibit A 8-9.) Instead ofrecognizing the many
courses and letters of commendation and recommendation he received during his time in prison,
the Board focused on the infractions he gained over a lifetime of growing up in a coITectional
facility, from his early 20s to his 50s, for which Mr. -

takes responsibility, and

acknowledges that he was a different man when he was younger. (Id. at 8 (regarding his
infractions, Mr . - notes "I can 't give an excuse, I was aiTested young, I wasn 't thinking
coITectly at that time"); see also Exhibit I at 12 (letter from Lifers & Long Te1mers Organization
Reconciliation Workshop, confm ning Mr. -

completion of a sixteen-week workshop

"developed to address and understand the internal and external steps that lead to reconciliation"
and stating that "Mr.

has displayed a willingness, with insight about his past toxic

behaviors and engaged in ways to repair damage[] inflicted internally and externally"); Exhibit I
at 5-13 (documenting Mr. -

myriad rehabilitative programs and educational achievements

gained during a lifetime of confinement).) The Boai·d did not consider Mr . - age as it
related to his likelihood for recidivism . (Exhibit A at 10.) The Board's only reference to Mr.

we just talked about, yow- discipline, that's high, 8 of 10. You understand that?" (Exhibit A at 10.) The
Commissioners were reading from an inaccurate COMPAS repo1t (later con-ected, see Exhibit J) that contained an
input that mischaracterized a protective custody as an offense, taking Mr.
prison misconduct score from
Low to High. See infra, Section D .
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-

coursework and growth is curso1y and incon ect, stating that "I see letters of the leaders

of the Otisville Lifers and Long T e1mers Organization, they're speaking to your training
regarding COVID-1 9 as well as a range of personal and emotional workshops." (Id. at 12.) In
fact, Mr. -

did not receive "training regarding COVID-19." Instead, the letter the Board

referenced simply offered an apology for the delay due to COVID-19 in their producing a letter
of completion of Mr. -

"Why Forgive" course, where Mr. -

demonstrated an

"understanding of the transfonnative powers of reconciliation, displayed victim centered
awareness, and empathy," not COVID-1 9 training. (Compare Exhibit A at 12 with Exhibit I at
12-13.)
These are critical facts that the Board overlooked, making its decision arbitra1y and
capn c1ous. See Thwaites, 934 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
The Board Improperly Considered That Mr. Deal For the Underlying Conviction

Did Not Take a Plea

A Parole decision is invalid when "one of the Commissioners considered factors outside
the scope of the applicable statute, including penal philosophy" or the Commissioner's personal
opinion . In re King v. New York State Div. ofParole, 83 N .Y.2d 788, 791 (1994); see also

Rabenbauer v. NY State Dep 't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 46 Misc. 3d 603 , 608 (Sup. Ct. ,
Sullivan Cty. 2014) ("This comi has been unable to find any statuto1y or case law that authorizes
parole board commissioners to infuse their own personal opinions or speculations into the parole
interview or process."). In this case, Mr. . . . . decision to maintain his innocence and not
take the plea deal that was offered to him in the underlying offense 30 years earlier was not
relevant to any of the factors listed in Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A). Yet, the parole hearing
transcript shows that Commissioner Crnse held Mr.
ago, and to admit guilt, against him.
7
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At th e hearing, Commissioner Crnse offered a brief description of the underlying offense,
and asked Mr. -

if his description is trne. However, Mr. -

having ah-eady explained

that he has a§ 440 motion pending, declined to state whether Commissioner Crnse's description
is "trne," as the perceived veracity of Mr. -

innocence was actively being litigated in New

York State comi . (See Exhibit A at 3.) After discussing Mr . - aggregate te1m of
imprisonment of 30 years, Commissioner Crnse proceeded to ask Mr. offered a plea. Mr. -

whether he was

explained that he was offered a plea but maintains his innocence, as

demonstrated by the § 440 motion. Commissioner Crnse proceeded to offer a telling opinion
regarding the plea deal Mr. -

was offered 30 years ago. (See Exhibit A at 3 ("Three to

nine, I guess you wish you had taken it, yes?") .) Commissioner Crnse's inappropriate focus on
this topic at th e hearing, despite Mr. -

argument maintaining his innocence, indicates that

it may have affected his decision. To the extent that Commissioner Crnse believed that Mr.
-

should have tak en the plea deal that was offered, an d the admission of guilt that such a

plea required, it was reversible eITor for Commissioner Crnse to consider that personal opinion in
deciding whether to suppo1i release.
Because Commissioner Crnse considered a factor that is "outside the scope of the
applicable statute," the Board 's decision must be reversed, an d Mr.

must be either

released immediately or given a de novo hearing. See In re King, 83 N.Y.2d at 791.
The Board Gave Impe1missible Weight to the Seriousness of the Past
Offense
It is settled law that the Board of Parole may not deny release solely on the basis of the
seriousness of the past offense that resulted in the person 's incarceration, and in th e absence of
aggregating factors. Matter ofMitchell v. N. Y. State Div. ofParole, 58 A.D.3d 742, 743 (2d
Dep't 2009); Matter ofFreidgood v. NYS Bd. OfParole, 22 A.D.3d 950, 951 (3rd Dep't 2005)
8
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(concluding that a parole denial that ignored factors such as the petitioner 's expressions of
remorse and disciplinary record on the basis that petitioner's instant offense was violent was
"inational under the circumstances as to border on impropriety."). fudeed, indications that the
parole decision is based exclusively on the seriousness of the offense will suppo1t a finding that
the parole denial was "a foregone conclusion." In re Johnson v. N. Y State Div. ofParole, 65
A.D.3d 838, 839 (4th Dep't 2009); see also In Re King, 190 A.D.2d at 432; In re Morris v. N. Y
State Dep 't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 40 Misc. 3d 226, 233, 963 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Sup. Ct.,

Columbia Cty. 2013) ("When, as here, the Parole Board focuses entirely on the nature of
petitioner's crime, there is a strong indication that the denial of parole is a foregone conclusion
that does not compo1t with statuto1y requirements.").
Rather, the Board must consider the dynainic factors of prisoner development and
rehabilitation. In re Rios, 2007 WL 846561, at *4-5. Moreover, even "a murder conviction per
se should not preclude parole." Id. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to

meaningfully review and consider evidence of rehabilitation and suitability for release. The
record contains such evidence: despite maintaining his innocence, Mr. -

has expressed

remorse for the last 30 years. (See Exhibit I at 47, Victim Apology Letter.) His institutional
records demonstrate that he has positively affected the people around him in many ways,
including by completing training to be an Alternatives to Violence Project Facilitator. (Id. at 9.)
He has demonstrated that extensive fainily suppo1t awaits him upon release. (Id. at 22-32.) He
has developed career goals based upon the skills he has gained in DOCCS custody and has a
position at an insurance company waiting for him upon his release. (Id. at 20-21.) And, given
his age and health, he is no longer a threat to cominit violent c1imes.

9
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Despite this evidence, the Board 's focus was backwards-looking. The Board focused
extensively on the details smTounding the instant offense. Despite asse1i ing his desire to act on
the advice of previously retained counsel and not say anything at the hearing which could
compromise his § 440 motion, the Board questioned Mr. -

at length about his offense, and

about why he did not take a plea deal 30 years ago, and the written decision itself states that: "In
your interview you denied your guilt in the instant offense and repeated your pending motion to
appeal your conviction. Despite your limitations in discussing the instant offense, what you did
discuss was ingenuine and confusing. When questioned, you provided vague explanation [sic]
and repeated yourself[,] standing on your denial of the instant offense." In fact, in framing its
analysis of Mr. . . . . case, the Board placed Mr. -

in an impossible bind, where to meet

their standard of contrition he would have to reject the arguments of innocence put fo1ward in his
§ 440 appeal. With no meaningful discussion of Mr. -

focus on Mr. -

growth, and with an extensive

instant offence, all premised on an invalid COMPAS repo1i that

demonstrated an incon ect risk weighting, the Board gave no meaningful consideration to Mr.
. . . . rehabilitation or to his capacity to reenter society. It is a stark admission that the Board
failed to take statutorily mandated factors into account. As such, M r . - was denied a
meaningful opportunity to secure his release, requiring reversal of the Board's decision.
B.

The Board's Denial of Parole Is Stated in Conclusory Terms and Boilerplate
Language, And Fails to Address The Three Prongs ofExecutive Law§ 259i(2)(c)(A), Violating the Executive Law and Administrative Regulations

When the Board declines to grant parole, it is required by statute to provide a decision "in
writing ... of the factors and reasons for such denial of parole. Such reasons shall be given in
detail and not in concluso1y te1ms." Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a); see In re Rossakis v. NY

State Bd. OfParole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 28 (1st Dep't 2016); In re Ramirez, 118 A.D.3d 707, 707

10
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(2d Dep 't 2014). Specifically, the Board must explain its decision with reference to the factors
for parole set forth in Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A), i.e., (1) why there is a reasonable
probability that the parole applicant would violate the law if released, (2) why release would be
incompatible with the welfare of society, and (3) why release would so deprecate the seriousness
of the offense as to undennine respect for the law. A failure to address each of these factors- as
occmTed here- is cause to reverse the denial and grant release, or in the alternative, a de novo
hearing.
The Board's decision contains only a curso1y reference to the first two prongs, and omits
any reference to the third prong of Executive Law§ 259-i(2)(c)(A), which requires it to consider
why release would so deprecate the seriousness of the offense as to undennine respect for the
law. The Board's failure to explain how, or if, it considered this prong also violates its own
regulations. See 9 § NYCRR 8002.3. Section 8002.3 states that " [r]easons for the denial of
parole release shall be given in detail, and shall, in factually individualized and non-concluso1y
ten ns, address how the applicable parole decision-making principles and factors listed in 8002.2
were considered in the individual 's case." Id. This oversight is reversible enor.
Next, the Board's decision in this matter is akin to the one vacated by the comi in In re
McBride v. Evans, 42 Misc.3d 1230(A), slip op. at *3 (Sup. Ct. , Dutchess Cty, 2014). As the

comi explained in that case:
While the Board discussed petitioner's positive activities and
accomplishments at the hearing, it then concluded that his release
was incompatible with "public safety and welfare." The Board
gave no analysis as to how or why it reached this conclusion. It
appears to have focused only on p etitioner's past behavior
without aiiiculating a rational basis for reaching its conclusion that
his release would be incompatible with the welfai·e of society at
this time.
Id. (emphasis added)
11
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While the Board pmpo1ied to consider the first and second prongs it must address under
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(A), it summarily concluded that Mr. . . . . release "would be
incompatible with the welfare and safety of society." (Exhibit D at 1.) The third prong is not
considered even cursorily. The Board's reliance on such boile1plate language without providing
any explanation about how it reached this curso1y conclusion is insufficient to demonstrate that it
meaningfully balanced these factors. See Coaxum v. NY State Bd. ofParole, 14 Misc. 3d 661 ,
668, 827 N .Y.S.2d 489 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty., 2006) ("The decision making is a process of
detennining which factors outweigh others: a balancing process."); Weinstein v. Dennison, 7
Misc. 3d 1009(A), slip op. at *8 (Sup. Ct. N .Y. Cty., 2005) ("[T]he Board is required to do more
than merely mouth the statuto1y criteria ... ").
The remainder of the Board's decision likewise lacked sufficient detail, in violation of
controlling statutes and caselaw. The Board summarily noted Mr. . . . . "Case Plan,
institutional adjustment, release plans, your discipline and your COMPAS Risk Assessment" and
did not address these factors in detail but instead smnmarily concluded that they were
outweighed by Mr. . . . . "disciplinary histo1y," and erroneous, see infra Section C, "high
risk for prison misconduct." (See Exhibit A at 15.) This rote recitation falls sho1i of what is
required to substantiate a denial of parole. See In Re Rossakis, 146 A.D.3d at 28 (holding that
the Parole Board violated the statuto1y requirement that the reasons for denial not be conclusory
when it "summarily listed petitioner 's institutional achievements, and then denied parole with no
fuiiher analysis of them").
Similar to In re McBride v. Evans, the Board's decision here did not address or explain its
conclusion that Mr.

many positive factors were outweighed by crimes Mr.

found to have committed 30 years ago. Fmihe1more, without a detailed explanation of this

12
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detennination and of how the Board considered the statuto1y factors in Mr. . . . . case, Mr.
-

is unable to prepare sufficiently for future parole hearings, beyond curso1y advice to

"spend ... time cleaning up your discipline, adhering to facility rnles, an d clarifying your release
plans." See In re Greene v. Smith, 52 A.D.2d 292, 294 (4th Dep't. 1976) (explaining th at " [t]he
objective in requiring the board to furnish reasons is to guide and to aid the prisoner in his
endeavor to return to society as a useful citizen").
C.

The Board's Denial Amounted to an Illegal Resentencing Based on the Board's
Own Concept of Justice

Moreover, the Board's subjective evaluation of Mr. . . . . contention that he was in
th e "wrong place at the wrong time" 30 years ago, claiming that such an innocence claim
" [d]oesn 't make sense" (Exhibit A at 7), amounts to an illegal resentencing. New York comts
have held that, "in focusing exclusively on the petitioner's crime as a reason for denying parole,"
a Parole Board is "in effect, re-sentencing petitioner to a sentence that excluded any possibility
of parole since petitioner is powerless to change his past conduct." In re Rios, 2007 WL 846561,
at *4-5. " [A]s the Appellate Division has admonished, under similar circumstances, such ' resentencing ' by the Parole Board ' reveal[s] a fundamental m isunderstanding of the limitations of
administrative power. "' Id. (citing In re King, 190 A.D.2d at 432). While th e Board may
consider criminal histo1y during parole detenninations, its heavy focus- almost half of the
decision is committed to a description of such acts-on the acts Mr.

was convicted of

committing in his 20s is improper. This conduct would have been properly before Mr. . . . .
sentencing judge, Justice Failla, who chose to impose a sentence ofto two consecutive tenns of
15 years to life for each attempted murder conviction, to nm concurrently with concmTent ten ns
of 5 to 15 years and 2

~

to 7 years, respectively, for the weapons convictions, see People v.

13
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-

205 A.D.2d 404, 404, 613 N .Y.S.2d 879, 880 (1994), for an aggregated sentence of 30-

years-to life.
The Board's focus on conduct that existed at the time of sentencing effectively
constitutes a resentencing to a higher minimum sentence. The Boar d's rejection of Justice
Failla 's sentence evinces the Commissioners' subjective views that a minimum sentence of 30
years-the tenn imposed by the sentencing comi in full light of the facts of the crime, criminal
histo1y, and after car eful deliberation at the conclusion of which the sentencing comi b elieved he
should be eligible for parole- is not enough time to serve for the offense. The Commissioners
repeatedly expressed their opinion regarding Mr. -

responses to their description of the

events that transpired during the crime for which he was found guilty, including, for example,
stating: "I'm sorry, if somebody's shooting in the middle of the block I'm not gonna [sic] be on
th e block. I'm not gonna [sic] be on th e comer ... I mean , were you taking photographs or
maybe you were on the com er just having refreshments?" (Exhibit A at 6). But " [t]he role of
th e Parole Board is not to resentence petitioner according to the personal opinions of its members
as to the appropriate penalty for murder, but to detennine whether, as of this moment, given all
th e relevant statutory factors, he should be released." In re King v. New York State Div. of

Parole, 190 A.D.2d at 432 . Here, the personal opinions of the Commissioners, including their
obvious incredulity, clearly guided their consideration of what penalty was appropriate for the
crimes Mr. -

was convicted of. Thus, the Board committed reversible error and its decision

should be vacated and reversed.

D.

The Board Relied on an Inaccurate COMPAS Assessment to Justify its Denial
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Decision
The Board's decision should be vacated for the additional an d significant reason that it
was premised on a flawed COMPAS risk assessment repo1t. The conected COMPAS risk repo1t
scores Mr. -

at a low risk f or every factor, significantly including prison misconduct. The

Board cited the en oneous repo1t multiple times in reaching its decision, specifically giving
higher weight to an incorrect "High" prison misconduct weighting in explaining its rationale for
denying Mr. -

parole.

The Board wrote that it considered " ... [Mr. . . . . discipline and [his] COMPAS Risk
Assessment. .. [Mr. . . . . disciplinaiy histo1y is a concern to the Panel. The Panel does not

depart from [his] low/unlikely COMPAS risk scores, however weighs heavily the high risk

score f or prison misconduct." (Exhibit A at 15 (emphasis added).) The COMPAS repo1t
before the Commissioners en oneously showed his Prison Misconduct score to be "High- 8."

(Exhibit C, Enoneous COMP AS.) However, the corrected COMP AS score shows that it is
actually a "Low - l." (Exhibit J, Conected COMPAS.) While the Boai·d noted Mr . institutional accomplishments, the Boai·d expressed concern that these accomplishments were
outweighed specifically by "the high risk score for prison misconduct." That is, the Board's
decision hinged on Mr. -

high score for prison misconduct- but this score appeai·s to be

based on inaccurate infonnation.
fu advance of Mr . - interview before the Board, a COMPAS repo1t w as prepared

on December 14, 2020. This repo1t rated Mr . - low risk for felony violence, atTest, or
abscondment. (Exhibit C, En oneous COMPAS.). It scored him low for criminal involvement,
low for histo1y of violence, but high for prison misconduct. Id. It also rated him as being
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unlikely to experience negative social cognitions or low self-efficacy upon release, and scores
him as unlikely to experience low family suppo1t . Id.
However, as Mr.

explained at his hearing, this high rating for prison misconduct

was the result of his Counselor inconectly ente1ing his involuntaiy protective custody (IPC) as a
Tier III infraction, answering "l" to Question 16, which asks "Total# of Tier 3 infractions
during the past 24 months of incarceration." (Exhibit C, Enoneous COMPAS at 3.) M r . attempted to explain the incident to the Boai·d:

Q: ... [Y]our last Tier III was in 2016 but in August of 2020 you
were placed in confinement. Protective custody, I'm sony. Right,
protective custody?
A: That's conect.
Q: What were you in protective custody for?
A: I was doing exercise and one of the cables broke and the cable
hit me so I went to the officers and I repo1ted it, the next day an
infonnant said that somebody had hit me so they put me in
protective custody.
[Describes that the infonnant is "of the facility."]
Q: Why would the infonnant say that if you were exercising and
you hit yourself in the head with a cable?
A: I don't know.
Q: And you never questioned it?
A: Of course I questioned it.
Q: And what did they say?
A: They said that since the infonnant said I was involved in a fight
they didn't want to take the chance of putting me back into the
population for three or four days.

(Exhibit A at 9.)
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Mr. -

requested a con ected COMP AS Assessment and one was provided to him on

March 9, 2021, with a cover letter drafted by a Senior Offender Rehabilitation Coordinator
("SORC") that reads, "Enclosed please find your conected COMPAS Risk Assessment."

(Exhibit J, Conected COMPAS at 4.) While this conected COMPAS repo1i again scores him
low risk for felony violence, anest and abscondment, and scores him low for criminal
involvement and histo1y of violence, it now rates him at low risk for prison misconduct. (Id. at
5.) A comparison of the two COMPAS repo1is shows that this decreased rating is due to
Question No. 16: in the en oneous COMPAS repo1i, Mr. -

had one previous Tier 3 infraction in the past 24 months of incarceration. This was

inconect. In the updated repo1i, Mr. -

social worker repo1ied that Mr.

SORC con ects his COMPAS and repo1is that Mr.

had zero previous Tier 3 infractions in the past 24 months of incarceration. Mr. -

was placed into IPC only for his safety, and not for an infraction. (Exhibit A at 9.) The social

worker incorrectly recorded a Tier 3 infraction in the past 24 months in the erroneous
COMPAS before the board, and it served as the centerpiece/or the Board's decision to place
"heavy weight" on Mr.

prison misconduct as evidence that he could not ''live and

remain at libe1iy without violating the law. " Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); (Exhibit A at 15
("The Panel does not depart from your low/unlikely COMPAS risk scores, however weighs
heavily the high risk score for prison misconduct. Your inability to follow rnles while confined
leads the Panel to question your ability to follow the law.") It was an enor to repo1i that Mr.
-

had one such prior offense before updating his COMPAS assessment during his initial

hearing.
This en or appears to be the sole basis for the increase in Mr.

score from low risk

for prison misconduct to high risk of prison misconduct. Indeed, aside from Question No. 16, no

17

FUSL000144

oth er answers to the screening questions changed between the two repo1is. (Compare Exhibit J,
Conected COMPAS to Exhibit C, Enoneous COMP AS.)
fu sho1i, the increase in Mr.

repo1ied risk of prison misconduct between his 2019

COMPAS report and 2021 COMPAS repo1i appears to be based on his new social worker
enoneously stating that he had a prior Tier 3 offense. That is not hue, as his conected COMP AS
repo1i and testimony before the Board accurately repo1ied, and is a historical fact that could not
change in the interim. Because the Board explicitly stated that it was relying on that COMPAS
score to deny parole release, and because that score was derived as a result of enor, the Board's
decision must be annulled.

E.

The Board Did Not Consider Mr. . . . . Sentencing Minutes, and Failed to
Consider Statements from Mr.
Defense Counsel or the District
Attorney

When making a parole decision, the Board must consider "the recommendations of the
sentencing comi, the district attorney and the attorney who represented the inmate in connection
with the conviction for which th e inmate is cmTently incarcerated." 9 NYCRR 8002.2(d)(7).
The Board failed to consider those recommendations here.
The Board briefly, and confusingly, addressed the absence of letters from Mr.
ti·ial defense counsel, the u-ial judge, and the New York County Disti·ict Attorney. The Board
stated: "It's customaiy that we write judges, defense attorneys and the DA regai·ding the
possibility of yom release, we did not get any response from them so we will continue with out
th eir input." (Exhibit A at 10.) The Boai·d simply noted the practice that was customaiy- it did
not state anywhere in the ti·anscript or decision that it affnmatively attempted reaching out to any
of the necessary pa1iies. The Pai·ole Boai·d Report suppo1is the fact that the Boai·d conducted no
such outi·each. After checking the "No" box after both Official Statements from the judge,
18
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Disti·ict Attorney, and defense counsel, and also after Sentencing Minutes, it states that the last
time such statements and minutes were requested was on December 19, 2013 , and that at the
time of request, such statements were "Unavailable." (Exhibit B at 1.) According to the Parole
Board Report, the last time statements and sentencing minutes were requested was almost 8
years ago. There is nothing on the repo1i to indicate that the Board requested the statements at
issue in the lead up to the hearing. Because the Board apparently declined to contact the judge,
disti·ict attorney, or defense counsel, and, thus, did not consider any statement they might have
made regarding Mr. -

it failed to consider a required factor in reaching the decision at

issue.
Additionally, the Board appears not to have considered the minutes from Mr. . . . .
1992 sentencing hearing. (Exhibit B, Parole Board Report (box checked "No" next to
"Sentencing Minutes").) These minutes would demonsti·ate that Justice Failla chose to give Mr.
-

a sentence range below the statutory minimum-1 5-years-to-life on each attempted

mmder charge instead of20-to-life, for an aggregate sentence of 30-years-to-life, a considerable
departure from the statuto1y minimum sentence of 40-years-to-life. The ti·anscript of Mr.
. . . . parole hearing and the Board's written decision are devoid of any reference to Justice
Failla's decision or to any other aspect of the sentencing minutes. The Board has committed
reversible eITor by neglecting to consider sentencing minutes in which the judge "implicitly
addressed" parole by, for example, "imposing less than the maximum on the lower range where
[the judge] had discretion," as Justice Failla did here. See Matter ofDuffy v. NY State Dep 't of
Corr. & C,nty. Supervision, 132 A.D.3d 1207, 1208 (3d Dep't 2015); Canales v. Hammock, 105
Misc. 2d 71 , 74, 431 N .Y.S .2d 787, 790 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (Board committed reversible eITor in
failing to review sentencing judge's minutes).
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Because the Board failed to consider statutorily required factors, its decision must be
reversed.
F.

The Board Failed to Meaningfully Consider Mr.

Reentry Plans

The Board must consider an applicant's release and reentiy plan when rendering a parole
decision. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (iii) ("release plans including community resources,
employment, education and ti·aining and suppo1t services available to the inmate... shall be
considered.") . In this instan ce, the Board focused mostly on the seriousness of the crime of
conviction during the interview. It paid little attention to Mr. . . . . reentry plan.
To the extent the Board considered Mr. -

plan, th e Board's decision improperly

relies on a prison counselor 's scrivener's eITor that it failed to remedy at the hearing, despite Mr.
-

raising of the issue. The Board states that "[Y]our release plan waITants attention. In the

interview you provided a proposed residence other than that noted in the record. Your
employment assurance letter was well noted." (Exhibit A at 15.) Mr. -

attempted to raise

with the Board that his proposed residence was inco1Tectly recorded by his Counselor, during the
following back and forth:

Q: ... If you 're released today, where are you gonna [sic] live?
A: I will live with my wife.
Q: And who is

(phonetic)?

A: That's my aunt.
Q: What happened to her?
A: When they did this they did this wrong, that was the alternative
address, the other one isn 't put there.
Q: Did you bring that to the attention of your counselor?
A: Yes.
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Q : And yom counselor said?
A: My counselor said to fix it here when I atTived here but it was
too late to fix it.

(Exhibit A at 6-7 .)
As documented in subsequent fo1mal and infonnal grievan ce reports, Mr. -

raised

with his counselor that the coITect release address would need to be changed in his fonnal Pai·ole
File to his wife's, Ms.

, address in

NY. (Exhibit E, Info1mal

Grievance; Exhibit F, Fonnal Complaint.) After questioning him regai·ding the change in
release address from his aunt to his wife, the Boai·d did not conduct any further inqui1y into this
eITor, instead moving on to questions regarding the type of work he would be doing upon release.

(Exhibit A at 7.) However, in its decision, the Boai·d relied on the prison counselor's scrivener's
eITor to demonstrate that Mr. -

release address was inco1Tectly noted, without asking any

fuither questions about the discrepancy or offering an oppo1tunity to coITect the record.
Because the Board failed to meaningfully consider a factor that it is statutorily required to
consider, insofar as it considered as trne a disputed fact, its decision must be reversed.
G.

The Board Failed to Meaningfully Consider Mr.

Deportation Order

The Boai·d must consider an applicant's release and reentry plan when rendering a parole
decision. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (iv) ("any depo1iation order issued by the federal
government against the inmate while in the custody of the depaiiment and any recommendation
regarding depo1iation made by the commissioner of the depaiiment...shall be considered."). In
this instan ce, the Board focused mostly on the seriousness of the crime of conviction during the
interview. It paid little attention to Mr. . . . . well-suppo1ied claim that he was in fact a
citizen of the United States, born in

, NY.
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The Board decision states: "The record notes an order of deportation. You have asse1ied
being born in

New York however have yet to provide proof." (Exhibit A at 15.)

Again, due to an enor committed by his Counselor, the Board was not provided with the entire
record, including Mr. -

birth certificate. Mr. -

provides two pieces of evidence that

demonstrate that DOCCS was in possession of his bi1ih ce1iificate but did not provide it to the
panel. First, he provides a Chronological Entry Sheet demonstrating that a request was filed for
his bi1i h ce1iificate on July 25 , 2017. (Exhibit G.) He also provides a hnnate Personal Prope1iy
record that indicates that, as ofFebrnary 5, 2018, his bnih ce1iificate was paii of his personal
prope1iy, alongside his maiTiage license and cmTent high school diploma. (Exhibit H.) The
Boai·d relied on an inaccurate record instead of considering the entire inmate record, including
Mr. -

bi1i h certificate.
Because the Boai·d failed to meaningfully consider a factor that it is statutorily requii·ed to

consider, its decision must be reversed.

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set fo1i h in detail above, the Parole Board's decision should be reversed

because it (1) failed to consider that Mr. . . . . age makes him highly unlikely to commit
weapon-related crimes in the future, (2) improperly considered Mr. . . . . decision not to take
a plea deal- a factor inelevant to the Boai·d's inqui1y, (3) improperly relied on an enoneous
COMPAS assessment to justify its denial decision, (4) placed too much emphasis on the
seriousness of crimes Mr.

committed neai·ly 30 years ago, making its decision an illegal

resentencing based on its own concept of justice, (5) issued a boile1plate decision that lacked
sufficient individualized analysis and didn't address the thii·d of Executive Law § 259-i(2)(A) 's
three prongs, (6) failed, in the past 8 years, to request or consider statements from Mr. . . . .
defense counsel or the District Attorney, or Mr. . . . . sentencing minutes, (7) did not
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meaningfully consider Mr. . . . . reentiy plans, putting too much weight on the counselor's
failure to update the file as Mr. -

requested, and (8) did not meaningfully consider Mr.

United States citizenship.
For the foregoing reasons, the Board's denial of Mr. . . . . release should be vacated.
Mr. -

either should be immediately released or granted a de novo parole hearing that both

complies with and provides Mr. -

the rights afforded to him by the laws and regulations of

New York.
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